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## **G**UERRILLA WARFARE

by

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## GUERRILLA WARFARE

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**P**RESIDENT KENNEDY told the nation on his return from Europe, June 6, that Soviet Premier Khrushchev had insisted to him in Vienna that communism would triumph in the new and less-developed countries of the world. Khrushchev was "certain that the tide there was moving his way, that the revolution of rising peoples would eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the so-called wars of liberation supported by the Kremlin would replace the old methods of direct aggression and invasion." Kennedy declared that, for his part, he believed "just as strongly that . . . liberty and independence and self-determination, not communism, is the future of man." But he saw the struggle as "a continuing crisis of this decade."

Communists are confident that they can turn local conflicts in their direction by use of "guerrillas or insurgents or subversion." What the free world is up against in combating aggression of this kind had been graphically described by the President in the special message he delivered to Congress on May 25. Aggression by the "adversaries of freedom," he pointed out then, "is more often concealed than open."

They have fired no missiles; and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others—by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone, by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas of independent nations.

Kennedy observed that "The main burden of local defense against local attack, subversion, insurrection or guerrilla warfare must of necessity rest on local forces." Indeed, where the local forces have "the necessary will and capacity, our intervention is rarely necessary or helpful," but where capacity is lacking, the U.S. military assistance program can be of help.

The President told Congress that "Our special forces and unconventional warfare units" accordingly would be in-

creased. "Throughout the services new emphasis must be placed on the special skills and languages which are required to work with local populations in all the social, economic, psychological, governmental and other efforts that are short of open conflict but necessary to counter Communist-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents." The President said also that he was directing the Secretary of Defense "to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations and . . . unconventional wars."<sup>1</sup>

#### TAYLOR STUDY OF MILITARY REORGANIZATION

Two days after delivery of the special message to Congress, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor submitted a preliminary report on military reorganization needed to meet more effectively the problems raised by Communist infiltration and guerrilla activity. The retired officer had been asked by the President on April 22, five days after the abortive landing of anti-Castro forces in Cuba, to investigate that affair and make proposals on how best to handle problems involved in guerrilla training, unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations. Taylor's initial recommendations have not been disclosed, but it has been reported that the Pentagon is considering setting up a special organization to carry on the training of foreign counter-guerrilla forces.

Khrushchev, speaking last Jan. 6 at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, said that "national liberation wars," beginning as uprisings "by the colonial peoples against their oppressors" and continuing in the form of guerrilla actions, would keep on occurring "as long as imperialism exists." Furthermore, because the Soviet Union regarded such struggles as "sacred wars," it would give help to the guerrillas who waged them. This policy's practical application in Southeast Asia has been demonstrated in Laos. Now, Communist guerrilla forces are concentrating on South Viet Nam. Their success in Laos and the threat they pose for the remainder of Southeast Asia have given special urgency to American efforts to devise more effective measures to cope with forms of aggression in

<sup>1</sup> *Paramilitary forces* are non-military units organized on a basically military pattern for auxiliary or diversionary duty. *Guerrilla warfare* is conducted in the main by dissident indigenous forces employing offensive tactics to impair a country's combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale for either military or political reasons. *Unconventional warfare* is waged within an enemy's sphere of influence, largely through use of local personnel and resources, to obstruct the enemy's attainment of political or economic objectives; it includes three elements: 1) guerrilla warfare, 2) subversion, and 3) action behind enemy lines by outsiders trained to evade capture and escape.

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which the "adversaries of freedom" have shown themselves particularly adept.

### INCREASE OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN VIET NAM

Forces of the Viet Cong guerrilla organization in Viet Nam have increased from around 3,000 in 1959 to more than 12,000 today. They are reported to operate in accordance with a carefully prepared plan. The Communist Vietminh (League for the Independence of Viet Nam) has stressed three primary objectives: 1) Disruption of land reform and other programs likely to strengthen the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem; 2) disruption of the republic's administrative organization and gradual displacement of its authority by that of the Viet Cong; and 3) drawing of key elements of the population into conflict with the government. The methods employed in working toward these objectives include subversion, murder, and sabotage;<sup>2</sup> establishment of "areas of liberation"; and ultimately the use of conventional military forces, in this case the North Vietnamese army, to overthrow the existing government. The guerrillas have gained partial control over large areas of South Viet Nam, but they have not yet succeeded in setting up any "areas of liberation."

Guerrilla fighting in Viet Nam, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, is illusive and sporadic. There are no military objectives of a conventional type. A hill or a town is never occupied for long. The guerrillas are divided into bands of 100 to 200 men each. They lack heavy weapons but are well equipped with light arms captured from the Vietnamese army, units of which are frequently put off balance by hit-and-run attacks at night in unexpected places. A well-disciplined network of informers, agents, and saboteurs provides the necessary intelligence and cover. And the rebels find sanctuary readily available across the 1,000-mile frontier with Laos and Cambodia where Vietnamese regulars cannot follow without risk of capture.

Members of the Viet Cong live with the villagers and work clandestinely to gain control of the village councils. They seek to involve peasants in terrorist acts and thus to commit them to the Vietminh. If the Viet Cong kills the village mayor, and then kills the deputy mayor within a fortnight, the third man who takes over the job either will

<sup>2</sup> More than 3,000 local officials, military personnel and civilians were murdered or kidnapped in 1960. See "Threatened Vietnam," *E.R.R.*, 1961 Vol. 1, pp. 363-366.

be pro-Communist or will be so frightened as to cooperate with the Communists. Casualty figures in areas of guerrilla fighting show that many more civilians are killed than soldiers. Killing an occasional military sentry accomplishes little, but murdering factory managers, policemen, railroad workers and the like gradually undermines the authority of the government.

A favorite Viet Cong tactic is to force peasants to dig ditches at night across roads to hamper the movement of government forces. Vietnamese authorities inevitably order the same peasants to fill in the ditches the following day. Such operations place the rural population in a squeeze between the Communists by night and the government by day, and eventually many of the peasants join the guerrillas. By such means a hidden political and military administration has won effective power in numerous areas. It is difficult for government troops in Viet Nam to protect a rural population that is scattered through thousands of villages and isolated settlements. The army can curb the guerrillas only if it can obtain the cooperation of the peasants, and it can obtain their cooperation only if it is able to provide around-the-clock security against terrorists. To intimidate any group of villagers, the Viet Cong only needs to strike once.

The bad effects of the government's inability to give full protection in the countryside have been accentuated by its failure to wipe out local political corruption and to allow more political freedom under what is essentially an autocratic central government. Political analysts agree that, no matter what the extent of foreign aid to South Viet Nam, the guerrillas are bound to make steadily continuing inroads unless Ngo Dinh Diem manages to build a more effective and popular administration. President Kennedy said at a news conference, May 5, that in the final analysis the leaders of each nation of Southeast Asia must themselves "organize the political and social life of the country in such a way that they maintain the support of their people."

#### GUERRILLA WARFARE METHODS OF RED CHINESE

Operational plans for the guerrilla warfare waged in Laos and Viet Nam derive from the experience gained by the Chinese Communists in their long struggle against the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese. The pattern of

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peasant-supported guerrilla operations developed by Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Red revolution in China, has become a model for Communist revolution throughout Asia.<sup>3</sup> To Mao, guerrilla warfare is a continuation of politics. He wrote in 1937 that "Guerrilla warfare without a political objective will inevitably fail; but if its political objective does not agree with that of the people, . . . it will also end in failure."<sup>4</sup>

While Mao was in fundamental agreement with the political theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, he adapted those theories to the non-industrial base of Chinese communism. Mao made the feudal exploitation of the peasants and China's need of land reform the political platform of the Chinese guerrilla movement. Although most popular guerrilla movements begin more or less spontaneously and sporadically, Mao recognized that it was necessary to organize guerrilla warfare and give it firm political as well as military guidance. He was wary, however, of burdening guerrilla operations with excessive centralized control. He repeatedly emphasized the necessity of independent decision by decentralized commands.

Only strong battalion and company leaders could effect swift deployment of fighting forces. Mao wrote that a guerrilla commander must manipulate his troops as a fisherman manipulates his net; that is, the guerrilla commander must be able to cast his net and close it at will in dispersing, concentrating, and shifting his forces. Guerrilla warfare, according to Mao, has to be based on careful planning, surprise attack, quick retreat.

Mao advised limiting the total number of men in a guerrilla company to 180, most of whom should bear rifles. A company would have a unit chief, a political director who would be the deputy chief, service, medical, intelligence and propaganda squads, and about 100 soldiers. Mao emphasized the importance of discipline in a guerrilla company but said that, because of the open and common political objective of officers and men, "conscious voluntary discipline can be established."<sup>5</sup> Complete egalitarianism as between officers and men was "incorrect," but there

<sup>3</sup> After China's Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang in 1927, Mao gradually built up armed forces which, despite numerous retreats and reverses, finally drove the Nationalist government to Formosa in December 1949. See "Russia and Red China," *E.R.R.*, 1960 Vol. II, pp. 730-732.

<sup>4</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *China's Anti-Japanese Struggle* (English translation published in Bombay, India, 1948), p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.

should be no great difference in their manner of living.<sup>6</sup> All guerrillas were urged to discuss and propagandize the goals for which they were working and the means of accomplishing them.

Mao concluded that unity of army and people was essential. Guerrillas must be outwardly law-abiding, not steal, and not permit self-interest to injure public interest. In one of his incisive analogies, the Red Chinese leader wrote: "The people are like water and the army is like fish," so "how can it be difficult for the fish to survive when there is water?"

#### GUEVARA'S GUERRILLA GUIDE FOR LATIN AMERICA

Ernesto Guevara, Fidel Castro's field commander during the Cuban revolution and now Minister of Industry at Havana, last year wrote a handbook, *La Guerra de Guerrillas* (*Guerrilla Warfare*), which has become a guide for revolutionary leftists in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>7</sup> Guevara's work, although influenced by the writings of Mao Tse-tung, is essentially an account of the lessons learned and the tactics used by Castro and his followers in the Sierra Maestra during their campaign against the Batista dictatorship. It shows in detail how revolutionaries, setting out with as few as 25 to 50 men, can in time topple a government.<sup>8</sup>

Guevara asserts that Cuba has made "three fundamental contributions to the mechanics of revolutionary movements" by demonstrating 1) that "the forces of the people can win a war against the army"; 2) that it is not always necessary to wait for ideal conditions before starting a revolution; and 3) that revolutions in Latin America should not be fought in cities, where historically they have started, but in rural areas. He observes, however, that guerrilla combat is simply a phase in a revolutionary campaign, because only "when the guerrilla army acquires a regular status . . . will it be ready for decisive attacks on the enemy and thus secure victory."

Conditions listed by Guevara as essential in guerrilla

<sup>6</sup> In the U.S. Special Forces School at Ft. Bragg, N. C., officers and men are given separate courses of instruction in guerrilla warfare.

<sup>7</sup> See "Revolution in the Western Hemisphere," *E.R.R.*, 1961 Vol. I, p. 25. A translation of Guevara's handbook, in condensed form, appeared in the March, April and May issues of the American magazine *Army*.

<sup>8</sup> Castro landed in Oriente Province with 82 of his followers on Dec. 2, 1956. The force, almost wiped out at the beginning, steadily gained recruits until finally it was strong enough to overthrow Batista, Jan. 1, 1959.



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warfare include: 1) Detailed knowledge of the terrain, which should be "wild and rough country, with steep mountains, or impassable deserts or marshes"; 2) knowledge of the surrounding population and its ability to provide supplies and transport; 3) knowledge and cover of all secondary roads for use in escape as well as in attack; 4) the ratio of guerrilla to opposing forces at any particular stage in any action; and 5) complete mobility. Guevara emphasizes that "the enemy should never become accustomed to certain ways of fighting"; the time, place, and manner of carrying out operations should be constantly varied.

The manner of guerrilla combat makes the squad the principal unit. Guevara says that no more than eight to 10 men can act together effectively in a fight in a jungle or in rough terrain. For larger guerrilla forces, the necessity of constant communication makes operations complex. Guevara is fully aware of the importance of psychological factors in guerrilla fighting; one of the tactical methods credited to him is always to concentrate guerrilla fire on advance columns so that opposing troops will come to realize that those in the vanguard are almost always killed. Squads of guerrillas may thus be able to provoke defections among soldiers reluctant to occupy advance positions.

The stress Guevara places on the importance of women in guerrilla warfare forms a part of the psychological approach. Not only are women useful as messengers, nurses, cooks, and teachers; because in Latin America they are underestimated to the point of discrimination, women usually serve the guerrilla cause with special zeal. This spirit is desirable at all levels. Each guerrilla fighter needs to be so devoted to the cause that, if necessary, he will give his life without hesitation.

Castro's field commander calls sabotage an effective weapon if properly directed. Rail lines, electric power stations and transformers, bridges, radio stations, telephone lines are obvious targets. Guevara says that sabotage should never be used against unimportant units of production, such as soft-drink plants, because paralysis of non-essential industries serves no purpose and leaves people without work. In the combat area, however, any sabotage may contribute to lowering of troop morale. Destruction of supplies, severing of communications, and constant sniper attacks may soon break the fighting spirit of a con-

ventional army combat unit. It was by skillful employment of such methods that Castro's initially small group was able to cause mass defections from, and finally to defeat, Batista's well-equipped 40,000-man army.

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## Long Record of Guerrillas in Warfare

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GUERRILLA WARFARE or its equivalent has long been characteristic of struggles for national independence, frontier fighting, and civil conflicts.<sup>9</sup> American Indians, silent and stealthy, were experts in guerrilla tactics. Their skill in surprise attack contributed to the decimation of Gen. Edward Braddock's forces at Ft. Duquesne in 1755 during the French and Indian War. Guerrilla warfare figured also in the American Revolution. Militia forces led by Francis Marion of South Carolina, known as the Swamp Fox, harassed British regulars in the South, struck in rapid succession at isolated garrisons, and made damaging raids on supply trains and convoys. Thomas Sumter, known as the Gamecock, also inflicted losses on the British in South Carolina that were out of proportion to the small number of men he commanded.

In the Civil War, Col. John S. Mosby won fame as commander of one of numerous Confederate guerrilla units known as Partisan Rangers. Commencing independent operations with only nine men in January 1863, Mosby's command grew by the end of the war to eight full companies. He and his men attacked isolated pickets, made daring raids behind Union lines, and proved particularly effective in plundering Union army supplies.<sup>10</sup>

Military opinion at the opening of World War I was dominated by the dictum of Ferdinand Foch that the basic requirement of modern war was to search out and destroy the enemy's center of power. Because the struggle in Europe was essentially fixed, with long fronts that re-

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<sup>9</sup> The word "guerrilla" (Spanish for "little war") originated during the Peninsular campaign in Spain (1808-14) when Napoleon suffered heavy losses from attacks by partisan bands.

<sup>10</sup> Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson observed in a commencement address prepared for delivery at West Point, June 7, that "The Communists will find that a nation which produced Davy Crockett and Daniel Boone and Jim Bowie is afraid of no forest, no swamp, no game of fighting however toughly it is played."

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remained static over extended periods, there was little call for guerrilla operations. However, the Arab revolt against the Turks in 1916 gave Col. T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) opportunity to direct Arab nationalism to the ends of the Allies. Lawrence's campaign not only helped to destroy the fighting strength of Ottoman Turkey, but also shed new light on guerrilla strategy.<sup>11</sup>

### WORLD WAR I ACTIVITIES OF LAWRENCE OF ARABIA

Lawrence viewed warfare as algebraical, biological, and psychological. He calculated that the Turks were occupying Arab-populated territory covering about 140,000 square miles, and that in order to contain Arab partisans fighting for their freedom, the Turks would have to maintain one fortified post of 20 men to every four square miles. To do that, the Turks would need 600,000 men, but only 100,000 were available. In addition, the climate of the Middle East, the desert terrain, and the exposed single-track rail lines all seemed to favor an aggressive Arab guerrilla campaign.

Lawrence's strategy was so to deploy the Arab force as to impose "the longest possible passive defense on the Turks . . . by extending its own front to a maximum." He created a highly mobile, specially equipped force, and used it successively at scattered points along the Turkish line, to make the Turks reinforce their posts beyond the economic minimum of 20 men. Lawrence said that "The ratio between number and area determined the character of the war, and by five times the mobility of the Turks, the Arabs could be on terms with them with one-fifth their number."<sup>12</sup>

The biologic element, Lawrence explained in the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, derived from the fact that to the Turks supplies were more precious than men. Consequently, the primary task of the Arab irregulars was to destroy materials, not to kill Turks, so surrenders were encouraged. Lawrence later emphasized the importance of gaining the support of non-combatant Arabs; he said that successful rebellions could be effected if 2 per cent of the population was active in a striking force and the remainder "passively sympathetic." Insurgents would always be victorious, he asserted, if the algebraic factors were favorable.

<sup>11</sup> Ferdinand O. Miskhe, *Secret Forces* (1950), p. 34.

<sup>12</sup> T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935).

**STRUGGLE OF TITO'S PARTISANS IN WORLD WAR II**

In the Second World War, irregular forces, applying the principles of guerrilla warfare, scored extraordinary successes in almost every theater. The reason was that German conquests in Europe and Japanese conquests in Asia had frequently been so rapid as to render impossible proper policing by the conquerors in the occupied areas. Activity by underground resistance fighters had never previously been so widespread. As the war machines were totally dependent on rear industrial and supply bases and on the lines of transportation to those bases, both were constantly exposed to sabotage or direct attack. Well-timed assaults by guerrillas on selected targets could, by destroying vital links in the strategic chain, or by diverting and containing essential forces, disrupt a whole plan of campaign.

In Yugoslavia, for example, more than 150,000 Partisans led by Josip Brozovich (Tito) carried on a heroic and successful struggle against the Germans. The goal of the Yugoslavs was not to soften the enemy in preparation for attack by regular armies, as in the case of the French Maquis and the German occupiers. The Yugoslav Partisans sought to effect the liberation of their country by themselves. Their war with the Nazis was total, and the people suffered for the support they gave the guerrillas in the form of supplies, shelter and information. More than a million hostages were massacred and thousands of villages were burned to the ground. As a result, every Yugoslav was involved and Nazi barbarity only redoubled Partisan efforts.<sup>13</sup>

**POSTWAR GUERRILLA FIGHTING BY DISSIDENT FORCES**

Most European guerrilla action in World War II was a response to foreign occupation and died down as soon as regular Allied armies were able to take up the struggle. The revolts against colonial or other existing regimes in Asia and Africa which followed the war brought new waves of guerrilla action that have not yet subsided. In the past 15 years China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, even the Philippines; Greece, Palestine, Cyprus; Algeria, Kenya, the Congo, and Angola have all been rocked by guerrilla-type fighting. The struggle in China between Communists and Kuomintang began much earlier, in 1927,

<sup>13</sup> The Germans lost twice as many soldiers in combat with the Yugoslav Partisans as they lost in their whole African campaign.

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and lasted for more than 20 years. The French, after losing an eight-year fight in Indo-China in 1954, almost at once became embroiled in another in Algeria that was destined to go on nearly as long and to end militarily in the same way.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union, not in position to promote world revolution after coming under German attack in World War II, was quick to aid and, where possible, turn to its advantage the numerous nationalist movements that clamored and fought for a new order when the war came to an end. Moscow became a ready supplier of training for rebel leaders, of technical information, of weapons to carry on campaigns of terrorism, and of psychological support both locally and in the world arena.

Indigenous guerrillas during this period have proved extraordinarily effective against regular armed forces. Col. George M. Jones, former commander of this country's Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, N. C., has pointed out that in postwar actions "One guerrilla has effectively tied down or dissipated the usefulness of 10 conventional soldiers." Jones observed also that guerrillas have "killed 15 conventional soldiers in exchange for every guerrilla fatality," and that they have "expended only about 20 per cent of the ammunition required to effect a casualty as compared to the conventional soldier's expenditure."<sup>15</sup>

Statistics confirm Lawrence's calculations as to why certain guerrilla operations are won and others are lost. In Indo-China, toward the close of the struggle with France in 1954, the Vietminh guerrilla force had a maximum of about 350,000 men, nearly all combatants, while the French Union had a combined total of close to half a million men but with a high ratio of non-combatants. Consequently, when it came to actual fighting, the French were almost always outnumbered in the field; and because the French needed at least a 10-to-1 margin of superiority to win, their cause was lost from the start. On the other hand, in Malaya and the Philippines, where the odds were against the guerrillas, regular forces were able to mop them up or wipe them out, but only after a long struggle and at great expense.

<sup>14</sup> France began negotiations with the Algerian Provisional Government at Evian-le-Bains, France, on May 20, thereby in effect recognizing that it had lost the war with the insurgents.

<sup>15</sup> Col. George M. Jones, *Special Warfare Center News Letter*, September 1959.

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## Means of Combating Red Guerrillas

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WHETHER inspired solely by a desire for national independence, as in Algeria, or whether waged to achieve Communist aims, as in Viet Nam, guerrilla warfare is basically of a political nature. It follows that moves to suppress guerrilla uprisings also need to give due place to political considerations. Counter-guerrilla operations are not likely to be successful unless they accord with popular feeling. If the purpose is only to ward off threats to a repressive or corrupt government, failure is to be expected. As was demonstrated in Malaya and the Philippines, a successful campaign against guerrilla elements requires a government with true popular support.

### DEFEAT OF HUK GUERRILLAS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Hukbalahap (People's Army to Fight Japan) was formally organized in the Philippines in 1942. After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, the Huk movement, which had the backing of Communists, was converted into a war against large landlords. Huk bands committed numerous crimes and practiced extortion and intimidation on a frightened peasantry. Their hit-and-run tactics in destroying livestock, plantations, and houses, seriously interfered with normal farming activities.<sup>16</sup>

In 1949 the Huk movement changed its name to the "People's Liberation Army," and its leader, Luis Taruc, who had held a seat in the Philippine House of Representatives, declared that its objective was to overthrow the government and establish a Communist regime. The Huks carried out large-scale raids in the vicinity of Manila and took possession of several provincial towns. The movement, drawing its strength from the plight of poverty-stricken and landless peasants, spread rapidly and reached a strength of about 8,000 men. At this juncture, President Elpidio Quirino ordered the Philippine army to take over the task of suppression, previously in the hands of the local constabulary, and appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense.

Magsaysay understood that the guerrilla movement was sustained by grievances of various kinds. One of his first

<sup>16</sup> See "Philippines in Transition," *E.R.R.*, 1950 Vol. I, pp. 358-359.

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moves, for example, was to reform the army, which the people had come to distrust. Army personnel were held strictly accountable for security in their respective areas and those who failed in their responsibilities were disciplined or relieved. Those who captured or killed guerrillas were promoted and given special recognition.<sup>17</sup>

The approach to the Huks was one of "all-out force and all-out friendship." As a former anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter, Magsaysay used the 60,000-man army with great efficiency, but he also offered those who surrendered an opportunity to adopt a new way of life. Government land was set aside for them and they were helped to construct basic community facilities.

A major effort also was made to win the support of Filipino villagers and to protect them from Communist intimidation. One of Magsaysay's most successful means of restoring village morale was to create a complaints department, which moved promptly to bring about correction of local grievances, especially those involving corruption in the army and the government. Another tactic was to give rewards for turning in weapons. Taruc had repeatedly emphasized that the Huks could not fight on effectively without the help of the people and Magsaysay succeeded in cutting off that help.<sup>18</sup> When Taruc accepted Magsaysay's surrender terms in May 1954, the guerrilla movement disintegrated.

Important factors in the success of the struggle against the Huks were that they had no "sanctuary" to which to retreat and that on their island base they were isolated from contact with the sources of Communist power. Even the most primitive guerrilla force needs a minimum of logistic support. Finally, the Communist ideology had little attraction for the Filipino people, 90 per cent of whom are Catholic.

### **BRITAIN'S SUCCESS IN ISOLATING MALAYAN REDS**

Anti-guerrilla operations in the Federation of Malaya showed what an enormous effort may be required, even under the most favorable circumstances, to overcome a relatively small number of guerrillas. It took 70,000 Commonwealth troops, backed by close to 180,000 police and a

<sup>17</sup> "Republic of the Philippines" (Department of State publication, 1960), pp. 6-7.

<sup>18</sup> Carlos P. Romulo, *The Magway Story* (1956), p. 113.



volunteer home guard of nearly 250,000 men, more than a decade to whittle down a terrorist force of around 10,000 guerrillas to a manageable remnant of about 600. The cost of the operation was estimated at \$1.2 billion.

It was in 1948 that the Malayan Communists, most of whom were of Chinese origin, set out to win independence for Malaya and establish a Communist state. As in other Asian countries, the guerrilla force initially was made up largely of men who had been anti-Japanese resistance fighters during the war. Many of the members were totally ignorant of communism, and recruits were attracted primarily by the opportunity to strike blows against British domination.

The plan of action formulated by the guerrilla leaders was standard: to take over communities in outlying districts and then, by extending such "liberated areas," eventually to gain control of the entire country.<sup>19</sup> Although the guerrillas managed to organize a sizable network of camps in the jungle from which to carry out raids against rubber plantations, tin mines, and railways, prompt and continuing government action prevented creation of any "liberated areas." The British relentlessly pressed the fight against the terrorists and made strong efforts to improve those political, economic and social conditions which gave underlying support to the rebellion.

The first step taken by the British, after the terrorist campaign began in 1948, was to declare the Malayan Communist Party illegal and to jail 1,100 of its members.<sup>20</sup> A national registration was then ordered, and every person was given an identity card bearing his photograph and thumbprint. Because the guerrillas did not register for fear of capture, any person lacking a card was automatically suspect. All personal movement was strictly controlled. The death penalty was imposed for unlawful possession of arms, munitions, or explosives.

Drastic measures were used against the "National Liberation Army" in the jungle. Infiltrated areas were subjected to mortar fire, napalm bombing, and artillery shelling. To make it impossible for the rebels to continue obtaining the food that had been given to them, voluntarily or under duress, more than 400,000 Chinese squatters were

<sup>19</sup> See "Red Terrorism in Malaya," *E.R.R.*, 1955 Vol. II, pp. 506-510.

<sup>20</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* (1956), p. 89.



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moved from lands they had been cultivating along the jungle edge. Resettled in villages that were circled by barbed wire fences and carefully guarded, the squatters were forbidden to take food through the gates. All supplies were brought in under convoy in sealed vans.

Massive military and police action was combined with intensive propaganda. Liberal rewards were paid to terrorists who informed on their comrades. Those who surrendered were given a regular policeman's salary, and a rebel could earn over \$300 by leading a patrol back to his comrades if this led to another surrender, capture, or killing. When Malaya became an independent nation within the Commonwealth in August 1957, the back of the guerrilla movement was broken. The emergency came to an end soon thereafter. Today, only a few hundred guerrillas remain in hiding along the mountainous frontier separating Malaya from Thailand, and they are more concerned with finding food than with fighting.

### TRAINING OF THE U.S. ARMY'S SPECIAL FORCES

To meet the threat of Communist guerrilla movements in various parts of the world, President Kennedy recommended, March 28, that the United States strengthen its "capacity to meet limited and guerrilla warfare." The Department of the Army then announced that it would increase its Special Forces units by 500 men in 1961.<sup>21</sup> Kennedy budget requests for fiscal 1962 included provision for 3,000 more Special Forces troops—a request which, if granted, will more than double the present strength of about 2,000 men.

Until the past year, the Army considered that the role of the Special Forces was primarily to support the objectives of conventional military forces.<sup>22</sup> Now, however, training of foreign guerrillas seems to be taking precedence. The Special Forces men are area-trained to teach indigenous forces the art of guerrilla warfare. Instruction is given in how to infiltrate a Communist country, arm and train anti-Communist groups, and then help them to ambush convoys, raid supply lines, disrupt communications.

<sup>21</sup> The Special Forces groups are located in Bad Tolz, Germany, in Okinawa, and at the U.S. Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg, N. C.

<sup>22</sup> "Guerrilla warfare comprises that part of unconventional warfare which is conducted . . . to reduce enemy combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale."—*Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* (U.S. Army Field Manual 31-21), p. 3.

Col. Irwin A. Edwards, commander of the Special Forces group at Ft. Bragg, said on Feb. 26 that "Basically, we make certain our men know three things: enough of the tongue he'll need for a mission to impart basic skills, how to survive, and how to socialize at the grassroots level."<sup>23</sup> Special Forces troops are organized in small, multi-purpose detachments of approximately squad size. A basic operating team consists of two radio operators, a radio repairman, a doctor, four weapons specialists, four demolition specialists, a team sergeant, and two officers. The men are cross-skilled so that each can take over the basic function of any of the others.

Critics of the Special Forces group assert that while the men are disciplined and well trained in such specialties as use of plastic demolition and tetryl explosive blocs, fragmentation hand grenades, and special detonator devices, they are not taught to improvise, an important element in guerrilla warfare. The critics state that the army is conventional in its training approach and that this is not the best format for guerrilla fighters, who must use unconventional methods. However, the new courses in anti-guerrilla operations will teach the soldiers "concrete steps to satisfy or nullify political, social, economic, cultural, psychological, and physiological needs, real or imaginary, of the resistance forces and potentially dissident population elements" in the combat area.

Special Forces trainees learn that to cement relations with the local population, they should participate in or support local celebrations, help to feed or clothe destitute civilians, provide medical aid, or assist in constructing local schools or hospitals. Anti-guerrilla teams learn how to build up rapport with local leaders and key officials in order to gain their support in gathering intelligence on guerrillas in the neighborhood.

The teams learn also how to destroy the tactical and political integrity of opposing guerrilla forces by vertical disruption of the guerrilla chain of command. This is done by blocking channels of communication between members of particular groups and units. Special Forces units receive detailed instructions on how to track down enemy bands and on how to maintain secrecy of movement. The

<sup>23</sup> Louis Kraar, "U.S. Army Takes Tip From Reds," *Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 27, 1961.

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most effective ways to surround and annihilate guerrilla groups are also taught.<sup>24</sup>

### AID FOR GUERRILLA TRAINING OF FOREIGN TROOPS

The U.S. Special Forces units will, when invited, assist in training military personnel of foreign countries in combating guerrilla activity. The army is establishing a training center at Ft. Gulick, Canal Zone, where a jungle warfare training center and the Army Caribbean School are already located. A maximum of 40 officers will attend classes at the new center at any one time. Training will not be specifically designed for any one country. The classes in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla tactics will be conducted in Spanish and Portuguese.

A memorandum issued March 20 by Lieut. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, Army Chief of Research and Development, stressed the view that the United States should assist in "developing a guerrilla warfare capability in friendly foreign armies, particularly where they border on countries with hostile governments with similar ethnic minorities," and that it should sponsor development of guerrilla warfare capability among refugees from Communist-dominated countries. The memorandum criticized the current American approach to fighting Communist-supported guerrillas as "politically sterile" because it does not match that of the Communists in combining military and political action. The author of the memorandum asserted that the best defense against Communist subversion was to exploit conditions for social revolt behind the Iron Curtain in such a way as to bring about overthrow of the Communist regime without starting a general or even a limited war.

Overturning a Communist government would not be the objective of most guerrilla operations. The main objective, as the United States sees it, is to harass Red regimes to the point where they will be so busy trying to get rid of guerrillas behind their own lines that they will no longer be able to carry on effective subversive activities against free world nations. Such an operation is said to be receiving serious consideration for North Viet Nam, where a large part of the peasant population is anti-Communist and where trained South Vietnamese could easily be infiltrated to form guerrilla bands.

<sup>24</sup> The most effective method is to isolate good-sized areas by concentric and simultaneous attacks. The isolated areas are then subdivided into separate sections in which bands of guerrillas are cut off one by one and destroyed.

It has been suggested that in planning undercover guerrilla operations, there is risk that the established American system of checks and balances in government will be bypassed by high officials with power to make final decisions.<sup>25</sup> Such constitutional provisions and guarantees as the right of Congress to declare war, the right of the Senate to advise on foreign policy, and freedom of the press may be seriously challenged by essays in guerrilla warfare. Not only would covert action on a wide scale possibly violate the country's international obligations; it might also alienate large sections of world opinion. Such factors have to be set against the presumed advantages of seeking to match or surpass the Communists in the business of subversion, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare.

<sup>25</sup> Henry Gemmill, "Undercover Warfare," *Wall Street Journal*, May 16, 1961.



